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Abstract: Determining the essence of any substance requires the construction 
of its definition. It is necessary to find a generic concept to construct a defini-
tion, and it includes the scope of the definition concept. However, there are 
such concepts to be the most general of their kind, and therefore generic con-
cepts cannot be found for them. These concepts are meant to be three most 
general philosophical categories: God, man, and the world. We call these three 
categories as permanent metaphysical structures. Consequently, human always 
seeks to outline the objects of his interest in his mind. If a definition is not 
possible, then they are replaced by explications or quasi-definitions. 
Keywords: Metaphysics, definition, religion, worldview, human. 
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Introduction 
Positivism and neo-positivism have developed the belief that philos-
ophy is gradually losing the problematic field of its own research, trans-
ferring it to the positive sciences. When science completely transcends 
the sphere of its study from philosophy, there will be only one task for 
philosophy i.e. to study the essence and methodology of science itself. In 
other words, in positivism, philosophy is reduced to the theory of science. 
It was these conclusions that determined the nature of the Vienna Circle 
neo-positivism, whose main subject of study was science. It was on this 
basis that Rudolf Haller Rudolf Haller wrote: “This group of philoso-
phers, mathematicians, physicists and sociologists formed a movement 
that organized its own congresses, published two journals and, finally, 
they continued the great tradition of the French Enlightenment with the 
powerful project of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, 
that sought to create opposition to the irrationalists and other opposite 
directions of our century” (Haller, 1993: 2). The era of positivism rapid 
development is long gone in all its modifications. But the question of the 
subject of philosophy remained constant. What should philosophy do? 
Will there come a time when all life will be the subject of the empirical 
sciences study, and that philosophy will no longer remain a problematic 
field? Can philosophy ever die? These questions are of concern not only 
to professional philosophers who such a disappointing prospect threatens 
unemployment to, but also to human civilization in general. After neo-
positivism had lost its leading position in philosophical discourse, these 
questions came with renewed vigor. The considerations outlined above 
give us reason to think about these horrifying questions and try to answer 
them. Philosophers of ancient times are convinced that philosophy is 
eternal, and no matter what the heights of science, it can never do with-
out philosophy. Based on these considerations, we set out in this article 
the task of analyzing the relevance of a statement about the philosophy 
eternity and its prospects. 
Question and Cognition 
Today, following the histories of philosophy and science juxtaposi-
tion, it is hard to disagree that all modern sciences have separated them-
  
B e y t u l h i k m e  1 0 ( 2 )  2 0 2 0 
B
e
y
t
u
l
h
i
k
m
e
 
A
n
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
 
o
f
 
P
h
i
l
o
s
o
p
h
y
 
625 
Permanent Metaphysical Structures 
selves from philosophy. If philosophy is an attempt to ask questions of 
existence, and science is an attempt to answer them, then every scientific 
answer to a philosophical question really narrows its subject area. So, the 
question of the philosophy perspectives comes down to the question 
whether something goes unanswered in the epistemological dialectic of 
questions and answers. If answers are the prerogative of science, then the 
sphere of philosophy will remain something that cannot be answered. It 
follows that if there are such objects that are fundamentally impossible to 
define, then philosophy is eternal. In other words, philosophy will always 
have something to do if there are items that can be asked but that no one 
will ever be able to answer. If some questions cannot be answered, then 
science will not be able to take them away from philosophy, and philoso-
phy will always retain its own segment in cognition. 
The answer to the questions posed not only by philosophy as a 
branch of knowledge but also by philosophy as a characteristic of the 
human essence is the definition. Not everything can be defined. There 
are such objects not to be determined by science. This science limitation 
occurs in two cases. The first is the lack of knowledge about the subject. 
When a scientist encounters something that neither he nor his colleagues 
have ever observed, then there may be a situation where the scientific 
community simply lacks the data to describe a new discovery. 
Insufficient knowledge does not allow us to formulate such a subject 
definition. However, this situation is not hopeless. The discovery is sure 
to attract scientists; they focus their attention and skills on it, invest their 
time and effort in its explanation. Eventually, this will accumulate enough 
information to define a still unknown study subject. The second case is 
much more problematic. It is well known that in order to construct a 
definition, i.e. to determine the meaning of the definition concept, it is 
necessary to form a definition, that is, a set of concepts whose product of 
contents is equal to the meaning of the definition concept. The defini-
tion, in its turn, should include a generic concept and the latter combines 
all the meaning of the definition concept and a list of all the specific fea-
tures that distinguish the definition from the scope of the definition 
generic concept. A generic concept is the essence of the problem. There 
are such cases when it is not present. We can easily explain what a square, 
 
 
B e y t u l h i k m e  1 0 ( 2 )  2 0 2 0 
B
e
y
t
u
l
h
i
k
m
e
 
A
n
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
 
o
f
 
P
h
i
l
o
s
o
p
h
y
 
Oleh Shepetiak & Oksana Shepetiak 
626 
a table, a star is… All these concepts are elements of other larger in scope 
concepts that are generic to the mentioned items above. However, the 
hierarchy of concepts does not go to infinity. The logical operation of 
generalization is not infinite, because of which the meaning of the con-
cept is impoverished, but its scope is enriched, i.e. the concept goes to a 
more general. Its series ends with the most general concepts. Such con-
cepts cannot be generalized. There are simply no generic concepts for 
them. That is why they cannot be defined. And what is next? 
The human mind is constructed in such a way that it always raises 
questions. Everything a person sees, hears, feels, gives rise to questions, 
which in turn require answers. Even the fundamental inability to give a 
comprehensive answer does not stop the person from constantly search-
ing for the answer. Therefore, human will seek answers despite the ap-
parent utopia of that intention. Logic provides for definition substitutes 
when it cannot be formed. Such a substitute is explication, which, like 
the definition, consists of two parts. They are explicandum, that is, a 
concept that is explained, and explicans, that is, a set of concepts that 
explain the content of explicandum. The purpose of explication is to 
explain what is impossible to define. Explication is also used when the 
definition is impossible owing to the temporary lack of knowledge about 
the under-study subject and when it is impossible conceptually. 
Kant's Big Questions 
Now we have the task to determine the concepts that are not defin-
able. We have outlined above that these concepts are the most general, 
and therefore there is no more general concept that in their definition 
could take the place of a generic one. The list of these concepts is fun-
damentally important for understanding epistemological issues. In search 
of these ideas, let us turn to Immanuel Kant, the meter of philosophical 
thought. The Konigsberg thinker believed that the process of cognition 
occurs in three stages. They are sensibility, understanding and reason.  In 
the first stage, the sensibility, the person perceives the world through the 
prism of space and time. In the second case, understanding, the obtained 
data are classified into twelve categories. The third one, reason, is the 
most important thing: the data processed the way they are collated to 
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form a picture of knowledge on the basis of three absolute ideas, i.e. God, 
the world, and the human soul (Kant, 1794: 248). 
These three ideas are crucial to cognition, because their interpreta-
tion underlies the formation of outlook. They are the most general, non-
definable concepts. There is nothing more than God, the world, and the 
human soul. Although they are not definable, they are necessary in the 
cognitive process because they are the three whales which the worldview 
is based on. There is no person who isn’t looking for answers to these 
questions. There is no culture based on these points of genesis. Through-
out the history of human civilization, God, soul, and the world have been 
interpreted differently, but have always been present at the heart of 
worldview systems. The way we interpret and understand these concepts 
depends on all perceptions of reality. They are not within the sphere of 
science, but science is based on a worldview, and therefore on the inter-
pretation of God, the world and man. They claim a special name, being 
outside of science, but influencing it, changing their interpretation, but 
always at the heart of the worldview. It seems to us the most appropriate 
is to call them as permanent metaphysical structures. In this term, the 
word “constant” should emphasize the fact that there is no culture and 
personality that these issues do not matter. The term “metaphysical” is 
intended to indicate that they are beyond experience and science, but 
define them. 
Let us try to consider each of the metaphysical structures and their 
role in human life. The first and foremost among them is God. We will 
not consider the problem of God genesis, since it does not relate to issues 
of epistemology. In this context, we are also forced to bypass the issues of 
philosophy, sociology, and psychology of religion. However, for episte-
mology, the key issue is the question of God. 
If we are talking about cognition as a man natural necessity, if we 
agree that the first step of cognition is a question to which a person will 
always seek answers, then the fact that everyone asks himself a question 
about God is the indisputable. Since man has existed, since then he can-
not distance himself from the question of God. He is present in man not 
only as the image he was created according to biblical descriptions, or his 
transcendental existential, according to Rahner's apt utterance. It is also 
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present in human as a cognitive idea that cannot be eliminated. 
There are atheists among the people, but there are no non-religious 
people because atheism is also a religion. The phenomenon of religion 
received many different definitions in the history of human thought. It 
was understood as a social phenomenon in Marxism and in its dependent 
philosophical concepts, as Marx did not regard man differently as just an 
integral element of society and productive forces. Sigmund Freud be-
lieved that religion was a psychological phenomenon to be matured on 
the basis of the Oedipus complex. Nietzsche claimed that religion 
emerges at a certain stage of evolution (at the human stage) as a reactive 
force that gives rise to a culture of resentment. All these definitions of 
religion are controversial. Religion is not a consequence of any trait that 
characterizes a person; it is itself a fundamental feature of man, embed-
ded in its essence. Both an ancient hunter and a modern businessman, 
both an Indian yogi and a Greek philosopher, both a Persian warrior and 
a European scientist, each forced to find their own answer about God. 
And this statement is a religion. 
Answering a religious question is one of the three whales in the out-
look formation. For self-determination, it doesn't matter whether the 
Sun goes around the Earth or the Earth revolves around the Sun. If we 
ask anyone to tell about oneself to express its views orally or in writing, 
we will not know about vis-à-vis astronomical opinions according to this 
self-characteristic, but we will definitely hear about his religious beliefs. 
The self-revelation of God to Adam had been faded by time and cultural 
stratification. Man, gradually had been losing his living connection with 
God, been sought Him in magical attempts to conquer the world with his 
own idols and false ideals. Wherever the religion search has returned, the 
fact of this search has always remained constant and unchanged. Ivan 
Ortynsky noted: “Faith embraces the whole person and all his existence 
dimensions giving them their own meaning, purpose and inherent direc-
tion” (Ortynskyi, 2014: 34).  
The phenomenon of atheism seems to be particularly striking for our 
consideration. Since the answer to a religious question belongs to the 
permanent metaphysical structures, that is, a question that cannot be 
answered in principle, it can only be imagined. Only God himself can 
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reveal the fullness of the truth about himself. But such self-disclosure in a 
revelation can be perceived or rejected by a person. The human mind, 
when seeking answers to a religious question on its own, produces a varie-
ty of explanations for God. These beliefs about God can neither be veri-
fied nor falsified. They do not make a clear definition. The atheists were 
able to abandon their belief in God, but they could not refuse the reli-
gion. Pope Benedict XVI wrote in this context: “Faith does not refer to 
the sphere of the constructed, though it touches it, but to the sphere of 
fundamental human decisions that cannot be evaded” (Ratsinhier, 1998: 
39). Every time a person gives up on true God, he or she must fill this gap 
with something else, even with an artificially created illusion of a deity. 
For example, the writer George Orwell proclaimed the words “God is 
power” through the mouth of his character O'Brien in the novel “1984”. 
(Orwell, 2008: 567). God is “man's view of his own essential nature” (Feu-
erbach, 1841: 221) for Ludwig Feuerbach. Man is not capable to give a 
definition of God. He is unknowable to him because there is no more 
general concept that could become generic for him. 
A vivid example of reduced explanations is human explication. 
Throughout the history of civilization, various outlines of human nature 
have been formed. All of them carry not only cognitive consequences, but 
also form an attitude towards the person in his environment. The emer-
gence of the evolution theory and the intensive development of biology 
formed the idea that man is a living organism. If the concept of “living 
organism” is set as generic concept of “man”, then the analogy between 
man and animal becomes obvious, as the animal is also a living organism. 
As a result of this quasi-definition, a human is reduced to an animal. In 
such a paradigm the attitude to man is formed and is not different from 
the one towards the animal. In the animal world where the law of natural 
selection prevails, a stronger one survives and a feeble, an infirm one dies 
because it is not adapted to surviving the harsh wildlife and becomes a 
burden for the flock. If a human being is a living organism first and fore-
most, then the human community is a flock where the laws of survival 
also prevail. It is common to destroy those individuals in such a human 
herd who are unable to adapt to the survival conditions and who become 
useless to the herd. As a consequence only in the human flock can abor-
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tion and euthanasia be the norm, not in a community of people united by 
mutual love. Unborn children, who are not yet able to protect themselves 
from the cruel decision of their parents and people in white coats sworn 
to save lives and health, are dying at their hands because they are unnec-
essary. And the unnecessary thing is usually thrown away. Similarly, peo-
ple from the world who through age, illness, and physical disabilities are 
no longer able to bring material benefits to the herd are expelled by eu-
thanasia. Paradoxically, the word “euthanasia” means a happy death. The 
feeble people murder is considered to be a fortune for them. Officially, 
such a death is called the happy one because it frees people from suffer-
ing, but, in fact, it is happy only because living and experiencing our own 
futility in the consumer values world is no more bearable than a death. 
The world of living organisms is brutal. At the moment a person called 
himself a living organism, that is, he equated himself with an animal, he 
really became like him, and the world he lives in became a jungle. 
Another common interpretation of the human essence is the “ele-
ment of society”. In most totalitarian states a person is defined as an 
element of society, state, nations, etc. If a person is an element of society, 
then he must fully adapt to society. Any totalitarian system is functioning 
as a mechanism, requiring all its members to meet its general standards. 
The mechanism is not able to reconcile with the identity of its members. 
If the part of the mechanism does not meet its requirements it is cor-
rected then, or, if no correction is possible, thrown away. It occurs simi-
larly in totalitarian societies that were abundant on the planet Earth in 
the twentieth century. Neither of them tolerated either the views of 
individual citizens or individual traits. Everyone should be the same, 
think the same, believe the same, and obey the same authorities. Any 
“norm” deviation is perceived negatively. The reaction scenario of the 
ruling system is always the same: first, freethinkers are re-educated by 
means of propaganda; if the re-education does not produce the expected 
results, they are isolated from other elements of society in specially creat-
ed concentration camps, so that their presence in society does not infect 
them with the dangerous beliefs of others; the concentration camps use 
the cruelest means of influence, the purpose of which is not only to in-
timidate, but to break the personality, to eradicate everything individual-
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ly, to make them repent of their own otherness; if such isolation does not 
produce the expected results, then the freethinker is physically destroyed 
as a part no longer suitable for use in the mechanism. If a person is an 
element of something, then he must be such as something, part of what 
he or she is. Years of blood spilled all over the world and millions of peo-
ple killed in political prisons and concentration camps in the twentieth 
century have become the payback for a failed human identification. 
Some mystical doctrines, especially prevalent among the peoples of 
the Far East, emphasized the human soul, completely ignoring the body. 
For example, in Hinduism and Buddhism there is a belief that any affec-
tion is a sin. Even affection to life is condemned. The goal of spiritual 
maturity is to be free from any addiction, including individual existence. 
Everyone must realize that its own atman (individual spirit) is nothing but 
Brahma, and as long as one considers the atman as a reality, separated 
from the general stream of being, until he attains salvation in nirvana. 
Such a radical emphasis on the man spiritual component and the com-
plete material side alienation caused the specific cultural type of India 
and the peoples who were culturally dependent on it. The Hindus and 
Buddhists have developed a deep and extraordinarily interesting spiritual 
culture where everything is subordinated to the sole purpose of promot-
ing spiritual growth and liberation from the material one. Instead, mate-
rial culture, science and technology did not produce the same results as in 
Europe. This is because the Indian genius was not interested in the mate-
rial world ignoring it openly. 
There are many similar examples in the history of civilization be-
cause “man became the main point of relations, as if it were the” measure 
of “everything” (Rusecki, 1994: 20). The axiology and human civilization 
existence depend on the way we define a person. False definitions of a 
person cost its dearly. Karl Rahner believed that “man is essentially am-
biguous. He is always placed in the world and always above him” (Rahner, 
1957: 405). It is in the Rahner’s teachings fundamentally important state-
ments about man appear. He believed that man was completely beyond 
the world. “Runner emphasizes the proof of the absolute man transcend-
ence, of his absolute openness to existence” (Kymieliev, 1985: 118). The 
wealth of a person's characteristics makes him a citizen of many worlds 
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but does not exhaust him. It is both a living organism, and an element of 
society, and a spiritual entity… but none of these characteristics depletes 
the entire multifaceted nature of the human essence.  
According to Rahner, the most characteristic feature of man is the 
transcendental existential, i.e. the orientation of man existence outside 
the experienced categories, to God, which is an absolute mystery, because 
“the inconceivability and incomprehension of God is marked as a secret” 
in Rahner’s (Muck, 1983: 151). According to Hrents and Olson, “he seeks 
to show that everyday universal human experience cannot be conceived 
without a holy transcendental mystery called “God”, and man knows the 
Holy Mystery of God every day through his historical environment.” 
(Hrents S, Olson R., 2011: 181). If the absolute mystery of God is decisive 
for man, and it is impossible to determine the mystery through obscurity, 
then man becomes a mystery by his involvement with God and this mys-
tery is not definable fundamentally. Rahner's associate Emerich Coreth 
held similar beliefs that “man is transcendental in his spiritual and per-
sonal essence, but as a spirit in the body, in the world, in history, he is 
equally bound by immanence, while transcending the latter”. (Coreth, 
1998: 195). Such considerations about man not only isolate him from the 
entire experimental world, but also uphold his dignity which Blair Pascal 
wrote to Blair Pascal long before Rahner and Coreth: “Man is only a cane, 
the weakest in nature, but it is a thinking cane. … If the Universe had 
destroyed it, the man would still have been more dignified than the thing 
that killed her, for she knew that she was dying, whereas she knew noth-
ing of the Universe superiority over her.” (Pascal, 2011: 298). 
The consequences of interpreting the world are equally interesting. 
All material things are in the world. Therefore, they can be defined only 
on the basis of a certain worldview. However, we cannot answer the defi-
nition what the world is. Various ideas about the world have been formed 
throughout history. In Claudius Ptolemy's system the Universe consists 
of the Earth in the center, planets orbiting the Earth, the stars that fill 
the sky. All this is enveloped in a fiery flame. Such a Universe is limited in 
space. Copernicus flipped the world by placing the Sun in the center and 
moving the Earth to the periphery. Now that the Earth is not the center 
of the Universe and, subsequently the very concept of the center of the 
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Universe disappears, the question arises about its limits. Descartes al-
ready holds the following argument: “It is inadmissible to think of the 
infinite, but to be considered simply boundless things with no boundaries 
we can see; they are the length of the world, the particles of matter sepa-
ration, the stars number, etc.” (Descartes, 1989: 324). This distinction of 
Descartes expresses his belief that only God can be the infinite and the 
world is boundless since it has no boundaries. In Kant, an even more 
drastic conclusion emerges: “The cosmological question about the magni-
tude of the world is first and foremost a negative answer: the world nei-
ther exists from the beginning in time nor has the extreme limit in space” 
(Kant, 1964: 470). Kant was convinced that the world is eternal in time 
and space in the subcritical period of his scientific activities. He named 
the seventh section “Creation in the total extant of its infinity both in 
space and in time “in his work “Universal Natural History and Theory of 
the Heavens” (Kant, 1755: 100-128). At the same time, the Konigsberg 
thinker was convinced that the world was created by God but the act of 
creation was not instantaneous: “The creation of the world is not a mat-
ter of one moment” (Kant, 1755: 113). It is fair to say that theories in favor 
of infinity are being developed today. An example of modern theories of 
the world infinity is Andrew Linde’s assumption according to which the 
world is infinite and filled with dense energy and the visible part of the 
world was formed by the dense energy dilution in the space ball (Linde, 
1990: 280). 
The hypothesis of the infinite Earth satisfied the inquisitive human 
mind not for long. Too much controversy has it caused. As a result, the 
problem of the world prompted scientists to search for new theories that 
could explain it more accurately. Today the dominant theory of the uni-
verse is to be the Big Bang theory, whose creators claim that the world 
arose from the explosion and the embryos of the universe were in a singu-
lar state exactly at that time. The Big Bang theory is based on the Edwin 
Hubble law (Hubble, 2013), according to the velocity of galaxies is pro-
portional to the distance between them. On this basis it was concluded 
that the explosion of the “cosmic atom” was the beginning of such a plan-
ets flight. Hubble published the results of his research in 1929. He was 
preceded by two theories that largely predicted and stimulated Hubble's 
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research. They were Georges Lemaître's the expanding universe theory 
(Lemaître, 1946) and the theory of the nonstatic universe of Alexander 
Friedman. The theoretical basis for these considerations was the general 
theory of relativity by Albert Einstein (Einstein, 1916: 769-822). 
The explanation of the world origin is interrelated with the explana-
tions of God and man. The boundlessness of the world in time and space 
denies the necessity of the Creator: if the world is eternal, no one created 
it. The Big Bang theory proves that the world has a temporal beginning 
and spatial boundaries. This denies the arguments against creationism. It 
is worth noting that Georges Lemaître was a Catholic priest and the im-
petus for his studies in astronomy was a Bible-based belief that God cre-
ated the world alongside his desire for a deeper study of his subject mat-
ter. Scientific proof of the beginning of the world contradicts the materi-
alistic worldview. Another argument for the beginning of the world is the 
theory of entropy as it was called by Rudolf Clausius in 1865. According 
to the second law of thermodynamics, heat will be distributed uniformly 
for some time in a closed space at all points in this space. The universe is 
a closed system. Therefore, the heat in it must be evenly distributed at all 
points. We do not see this. This means that the heat distribution process 
is still ongoing. If it continues, it should have once begun. If the world 
were eternal, then the process of heat distribution would begin and end 
indefinitely. Since it is not over yet, the world is not eternal. 
These considerations are important not only to explain the world 
origin but also the man emergence. On the basis of the claim that the 
world has no boundaries neither in space nor in time; it can be assumed 
that all possibilities without exception can be realized in it. The well-
known model of possible worlds, used to explain the correlation of modal 
(apodictic, asertoric, and problematic) judgments, can be ontologically 
realized only under the space-time boundlessness of the world. If all the 
possibilities in the world can be realized, and life, as it is, is an opportuni-
ty, then the probability of a spontaneous origin of life is high enough. If, 
however, the world is limited in time and space, then it becomes neces-
sary to determine the probability of its spontaneous origin by comparing 
all the necessary conditions for the origin of life. Taking into account all 
the prerequisites known in modern science, it turned out that the spon-
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taneous origin of life is close to zero. Astrophysicist Hugh Ross has come 
to believe that the likelihood of a spontaneous origin of life is so low that 
it cannot be considered (Ross, 1997: 256). If the spontaneous origin of life 
is so improbable, then the accidental origin of a man is not worth talking 
about. This, in turn, requires the presence of a Creator who would create 
living organisms. One of the consequences of such calculations was the 
formulation of the so-called “anthropic principle” formed by Brandon 
Carter in 1974 (Löffler, 2006: 72). It is based on the following that if the 
probability of origin of life in general and, of man in particular is so low 
that the belief in the spontaneous origin of life and a an cannot be taken 
seriously, it means that the whole world was formed in a way to be fit for 
human origin. In other words, a man could not appear by accident as the 
coincidence of circumstances necessary for its occurrence is almost im-
possible. It follows that the world was formed with a definite, well-
defined goal, and that purpose is human. 
Conclusion 
The innumerable reflections on God, the world and man, as well as 
their inseparable relationships, testify to their influence on the formation 
of all human knowledge. It is inherent for a person to find the answers to 
the questions. We formulate these answers in the definition. Each defini-
tion must include a generic concept. The number of generalizations is not 
infinite. It ends with the most general concepts - the permanent meta-
physical structures that God, man, and the world belong to. As we are not 
able to define them and there is no more general concept about them, we 
are looking for some explications or quasi-definitions for them. All fur-
ther cognition depends on which explanation of the stable metaphysical 
structures we choose, it is these concepts that become generic for lower-
generality concepts. For a man who believes in God, the world cannot be 
infinite in time and space. For those who are persuaded that man is the 
most precious creation of God, there can be no conviction that a person 
who thinks differently needs an ideological correction, and that person 
who has fulfilled his workforce can be destroyed by euthanasia. Since 
metaphysical structures can never be defined, and at the same time will 
always determine the direction of all further knowledge, they will always 
remain the prerogative of philosophy, which will raise questions about 
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them, and will form options for answers, which in turn will determine the 
world outlook, culture, science, and morality, social norms ,etc. 
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Öz: Herhangi bir maddenin özünü belirlemek, tanımının oluşturulmasını gerek-
tirir. Bir tanım oluşturmak için genel bir kavram bulmak gerekir ve tanım kav-
ramının kapsamını içerir. Bununla birlikte, türlerinin en genelleri gibi kavramlar 
vardır ve bu nedenle onlar için genel kavram bulunamaz. Bu kavramlar en genel 
üç felsefi kategoridir: Tanrı, insan ve dünya. Bu üç kategoriyi kalıcı metafizik 
yapılar olarak adlandırıyoruz. Sonuç olarak, insan her zaman zihnindeki ilgisinin 
nesnelerini ana hatlarıyla çizmeye çalışır. Tanım mümkün değilse, bunların ye-
rine açıklamalar veya yarı tanımlamalar gelir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Metafizik, tanım, din, dünya görüşü, insan.  
